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NINE JUSTICES, TEN YEARS:
A STATISTICAL RETROSPECTIVE
The 2003 Term marked an unprecedented milestone for the Su-
preme Court: for the first time in history, nine Justices celebrated a full
decade presiding together over the nation's highest court.' The conti-
nuity of the current Court is especially striking given that, on average,
one new Justice has been appointed approximately every two years
since the Court's expansion to nine members in 1837.2 Although the
Harvard Law Review has prepared statistical retrospectives in the
past,3 the last decade presents a rare opportunity to study the Court
free from the disruptions of intervening appointments.
Presented here is a review of the 823 cases decided by the Court
over the past decade. Of course, bare statistics cannot capture the nu-
anced interactions among the Justices nor substantiate any particular
theory about the complex dynamics of the Court. Rather, this statisti-
cal compilation and the preliminary observations articulated here are
intended only as a starting point - a modest effort to showcase trends
that deserve closer attention and to jumpstart more robust analyses of
how the Court, despite its apparent stability, has evolved over the past
decade.
Even a cursory review of this retrospective produces several note-
worthy insights. Some implicate broad institutional trends that cannot
be explained by the voting patterns of any particular Justice. For in-
stance, Table I suggests that while the Court has reviewed a decreasing
number of cases from its appellate docket, in forma pauperis petiti-
tions have climbed steadily despite judicial4 and congressional 5 efforts
to curb this trend. 6 What has not changed is the Ninth Circuit's status
1 A seven-Justice Court sat together for more than a decade only once, from Justice Joseph
Story's appointment in 1812 to Justice Brockholst Livingston's death in 1823. See SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES I (n.d.), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutimembers.pdf (last visited Oct.
It, 2004). Justice Stephen Breyer, the most recent appointee to the Court, took the judicial oath
on August 3, 1994. Id. at 2.
2 Eighty-five Justices have been appointed to the Court since 1837, when the Court was ex-
panded to nine members, yielding an average of one new Justice every two years. See id. at 1-2.
3 The Supreme Court, i999 Term-The Supreme Court in the Nineties: A Statistical Retro-
spective, 114 HARv. L. REV. 402 (2000); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-The Supreme Court in
the Eighties: A Statistical Retrospective, 104 HARV L. RE';. 367 (990).
4 See Martin v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 5o6 U.S. i, 2 (1992) (per curiam) (ordering the Clerk of
the Court to refuse in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari from petitioners abusing the Court's
certiorari process). But see id. at 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 The Prison Litigation Reform Act, for example, contains a "three strikes" provision barring
in forma pauperis actions by prisoners who have previously filed three frivolous claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) (2000).
6 This trend may be attributed to ballooning prison population and inmate litigation. See
generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV L. REV 1555 (2003).
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as the tribunal most frequently reversed by the Supreme Court - a
trend noted by legislators7 and jurists" alike. Table VI(D) reveals that
the Ninth Circuit accounts for over thirty percent of the cases in which
the Supreme Court reversed a federal court of appeals decision. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit's docket size no doubt offers a partial expla-
nation, this side-by-side comparison is nonetheless striking.
FIGURE i. SUPREME COURT REVERSALS
OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Percentage of all Supreme
Court reversals of federal
courts of appeals, by circuit
(1994 to. 3) 0O'O
5 it d od 4th tch 6t 7th 0th M th 1oth -h DC Fe1r-l
Unique to this retrospective is the possibility of documenting a spe-
cific Justice's voting pattern without the complications of changes in
the Court's composition. Take, for example, Justice O'Connor, whose
vote is widely regarded as crucial in close cases. 9 Table V confirms
that Justice O'Connor found herself in five-Justice majorities more of-
ten than any of her colleagues, casting decisive votes in over three-
7 See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, Part 6, io8th Cong. 533 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (describing the Ninth
Circuit's reversal rate in the Supreme Court as the "highest and widest ... in the country"), avail-
able at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member statement.cfm?id= io 3 o&wit id=2628.
8 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lockyer, No. 01-55246, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1719o, at *8o-8i (9th
Cir. June 14, 2004) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate in
certain contexts "has become a source of repeated public embarrassment").
9 See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 65 (1996); Lyle Denniston, High Court OK's
School Vouchers, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2002, at Ai (noting that Justice O'Connor is often
the deciding vote in close cases).
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quarters of 5-4 decisions.10 In these closest of cases, two coalitions
have been said to flank Justice O'Connor." To one side were Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor
voted twenty-eight times. To the other were Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, with whom she voted
eighty-two times. But an analysis of Justice O'Connor's voting ten-
dencies in all cases - not just 5-4 ones - demonstrates that her rates
of agreement with the two coalitions appear to have converged over
the past eight years. 12
FIGURE 2. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S VOTING ALIGNMENTS
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These statistics also reinforce longstanding characterizations of Justice
Stevens as the Court's most independent voice. 13 Table III(B) demon-
strates that Justice Stevens issued more dissenting opinions - 251 in
total - than any other Justice. In fact, he authored more than twice
10 Justice Kennedy has also been characterized as a "swing vote," particularly in the Court's
First Amendment and religious freedom jurisprudence. See, e.g., R. Collin Mangrum, State Aid
to Students in Religiously Affiliated Schools: Agostini v. Felton, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. i155
,
1205 (1998).
11 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The October 2000
Term, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 281, 287 (2003) (describing Justice O'Connor's choice between
the "conservative bloc" and the "liberal four").
12 This trend did not hold last Term, however, when Justice O'Connor aligned herself with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas seventy-two percent of the
time.
13 See, e.g., ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION i
(1988); Linda Greenhouse, In the Matter of Labels, a Loner, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1984, at A8.
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as many dissents as Justice O'Connor and nearly three times as many
as Justice Kennedy.
But the statistics also shed light on other popular impressions about
the Justices. The voting patterns of Justices Scalia and Thomas, for
example, have long been cast as unusually indistinguishable. 14 Table
II(B) indeed indicates that Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed in 86.7%
of cases during the past decade, more than any other two members of
the Court. It also reveals, however, that Justices Souter and Ginsburg
- who have received far less attention for their jurisprudential simi-
larities - agreed in 85.6% of the cases over the same period. In addi-
tion, contrary to the view that Justice Thomas infrequently authors
opinions, 15 Table III(A) reveals that Justice Thomas has emerged as
one of the Court's most prolific writers: over the past three years, Jus-
tice Thomas averaged nearly twenty-six opinions per Term, more than
all but two of his colleagues. 16
Raw numbers, of course, will never tell the full story. Why have
certain circuits consistently suffered higher rates of reversal than oth-
ers? Do voting coalitions change from one substantive field to the
next? And, indeed, what effect has the Court's continuity ultimately
had on its jurisprudence? We hope this retrospective will help to raise
such questions and inspire the scholarship that endeavors to answer
them.
14 See, e.g., Richard Carelli, Thomas' Decisions Show Archconservative Bent, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 27, 1992, at iC (quoting one litigator's assessment that Justice Thomas
could become a "clone" of Justice Scalia).
15 See, e.g., Kathryn E. Diaz, There Is No Plain Meaning: The Jurisprudence of ERISA and
the "Exclusive Benefit" Rule, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 7 1, 93 (2oo) (describing Justice Thomas
as the "least prolific opinion writer on the Court").
16 Interestingly, Justice Thomas's opinion production reached its lowest point - sixteen - in
1996, the same Term that his rate of agreement with Justice Scalia reached its peak - 97.7%. By
comparison, Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed in just 75.9% of the cases last Term, when Justice
Thomas authored a personal-record twenty-seven opinions.
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TABLE la
(A) FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Original Docket 2 5 2 1 2 5 2 1 1 2
Appellate Docket 2155 2081 2083 2106 2066 2096 1981 1890 1855 1749
On Reviewb 87 74 82 80 82 104 76 82 82 71
Summarily Decided 52 62 66 36 44 34 63 57 46 37
Appeals and Petitions 2016 1945 1935 1990 1940 1958 1842 1751 1727 1641
for Review Denied,
Dismissed, or
Withdrawn
Miscellaneous Docket 4976 4511 4606 4611 4947 5273 5730 6133 6486 6030
On Reviewb 7 17 9 16 10 18 11 6 10 12
Summarily Decided 14 55 15c 14 11 16 61 13 17 13
Appeals and Petitions 4955 4439 4582 4581 4926 5239 5658 6114 6459 6005
for Review Denied,
Dismissed, or
Withdrawn
Total 7133 6597 6691 6718 7015 7374 7713 8024 8342 7781
(B) METHOD OF DISPOSITIONd
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
On Review 94 91 91 96 92 122 87 88 92 83
Summarily Decided 66 117 81 50 55 50 124 70 63 50
By Denial, Dismissal, 6971 6384 6517 6571 6866 7197 7500 7865 8186 7646
or Withdrawal of
Appeals or Petitions
for Review
(C) DISPOSITION OF CASES REVIEWED ON WRIT OF CERTIORARIe
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Percentage Reversed 37.3 24.2 32.9 30.6 33.8 39.5 27.0 35.2 24.6 43.2
Percentage Vacated 43.0 59.8 50.6 43.3 48.5 36.1 58.2 46.2 42.1 42.4
Percentage Affirmed 19.7 16.0 16.5 26.1 17.7 24.4 14.8 18.6 33.3 14.4
a All information in Table I is derived from data provided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term--The Statistics, i i8 HARV. L. REV. 497, 504 n.a (2004); see also,
e.g., October Term 2003, Statistical Sheet No. 28 (June 30, 2004) (unpublished statistical sheet, on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
b The Harvard Law Review's annual Statistics introduced the category "On Review" in 1998.
See The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-The Statistics, i12 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372 n.d (1998) (de-
scribing the distinction between this category and its predecessor). Data for the 1994, 1995, and
1996 Terms have been assembled by evaluating statistics provided by the Supreme Court in its
annual journal. See, e.g., Statistics as of June 29, 1995, J. SuP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 1994, at II,
available at http://supremecourtus.gov/orders/journal.html. For these years, the number of deci-
sions made "On Review" was determined by adding the total number of petitions for certiorari
and appeals granted by the Court to the number of cases available for argument at the beginning
of the Term, and then subtracting those available for argument after the end of the Term. These
decisions were then allocated between the appellate and miscellaneous dockets such that the sum
of "On Review," "Summarily Decided," and "Appeals and Petitions for Review Denied, Dismissed,
or Withdrawn" on each docket matched the total number of cases on each docket according to the
Supreme Court's own report. In the data for October Term 1997, a discrepancy of one case was
noted between the sum of "On Review," "Summarily Decided," and "Appeals and Petitions De-
nied, Dismissed, or Withdrawn" and the total number of cases disposed according to the Journal.
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TABLE I (continued)
As a result, the total number of cases reported in the appellate docket here is higher than the total
number of cases in the appellate docket according to the Journal.
, In the I996 Term, the Harvard Law Review's annual Statistics did not include the number
of cases that were summarily decided in the miscellaneous docket. The figure in this table was,
therefore, calculated by subtracting the number of cases in which review was granted from the
total number of cases decided on the merits in the miscellaneous docket during that Term. See
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-The Statistics, i i i HARV. L. REV. 431, 435 (1997).
' The data in this table were derived directly from Table II(A) of the annual Statistics rather
than from Table II(C), which has intermittently included cases from the Court's original docket
not relevant to this analysis. See The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-The Statistics, 112 HARV L.
REV. 366, 373 n.k (1998). These data were derived by adding the number of cases disposed by
each method within the appellate and miscellaneous dockets. Cases arising under original juris-
diction have been excluded.
' This table includes only cases disposed of by full opinions or by per curiam opinions con-
taining legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full opinions. For examples of per
curiam opinions containing sufficient legal reasoning to be included in these tables, see The Su-
preme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 497 n.a (2004).
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TABLE II
(Al) VOTING ALIGNMENTS BY PERCENTAGE: 1994-1998'
1995 - 49.4 79.7 82.3 78.5 67.1 82.1 65.8 58.2
Rehnquist 1996 - 53.5 78.8 81.4 84.9 69.8 81.4 67.4 60.5
1997 - 62.4 84.8 74.2 89.2 73.1 77.4 74.2 73.1
1998 - 39.5 82.5 81.5 81.5 59.3 87.7 51.9 56.3
1994 50.6 - 55.3 45.2 61.2 69.4 42.4 75.0 70.7
1995 49.4 - 59.7 45.5 64.9 70.1 44.7 72.7 74.0
Stevens 1996 53.5 - 55.3 44.2 61.6 73.3 44.2 79.1 77.9
1997 62.4 - 62.0 48.4 65.6 75.3 54.8 77.4 76.3
1998 39.5 - 46.3 44.4 46.9 67.9 37.0 74.1 70.0
1994 76.7 55.3 - 68.2 75.6 76.7 67.4 64.7 74.4
1995 79.7 59.7 - 72.2 78.5 78.5 71.8 68.4 74.7
O'Connor 1996 78.8 55.3 - 78.8 80.0 70.6 80.0 69.4 67.1
1997 84.8 62.0 - 72.8 85.9 72.8 78.3 65.2 75.0
1998 82.5 46.3 - 77.5 80.0 68.8 75.0 62.5 68.4
1994 80.0 45.2 68.2 - 75.3 60.0 88.2 59.5 59.3
1995 82.3 45.5 72.2 - 73.4 60.8 87.2 58.2 54.4
Scalia 1996 81.4 44.2 78.8 - 79.1 61.6 97.7 58.1 53.5
1997 74.2 48.4 72.8 - 68.8 62.4 87.1 58.1 57.0
1998 81.5 44.4 77.5 - 72.8 60.5 84.0 53.1 50.0
1994 83.7 61.2 75.6 75.3 - 73.3 73.3 76.5 72.0
1995 78.5 64.9 78.5 73.4 - 74.7 69.2 75.9 68.4
Kennedy 1996 84.9 61.6 80.0 79.1 - 72.1 79.1 67.4 65.1
1997 89.2 65.6 85.9 68.8 - 75.3 76.3 74.2 78.5
1998 81.5 46.9 80.0 72.8 - 63.0 72.8 61.7 60.0
1994 68.6 69.4 76.7 60.0 73.3 - 55.8 80.0 82.9
1995 67.1 70.1 78.5 60.8 74.7 - 57.7 83.5 88.6
Souter 1996 69.8 73.3 70.6 61.6 72.1 - 61.6 79.1 76.7
1997 73.1 75.3 72.8 62.4 75.3 - 62.4 86.0 83.9
1998 59.3 67.9 68.8 60.5 63.0 - 55.6 84.0 78.8
1994 81.4 42.4 67.4 88.2 73.3 55.8 - 54.1 58.5
1995 82.1 44.7 71.8 87.2 69.2 57.7 - 55.1 48.7
Thomas 1996 81.4 44.2 80.0 97.7 79.1 61.6 - 58.1 52.3
1997 77.4 54.8 78.3 87.1 76.3 62.4 - 59.1 61.3
1998 87.7 37.0 75.0 84.0 72.8 55.6 - 45.7 50.0
1994 67.1 75.0 64.7 59.5 76.5 80.0 54.1 - 82.7
1995 65.8 72.7 68.4 58.2 75.9 83.5 55.1 - 74.7
Ginsburg 1996 67.4 79.1 69.4 58.1 67.4 79.1 58.1 - 81.4
1997 74.2 77.4 65.2 58.1 74.2 86.0 59.1 - 82.8
1998 51.9 74.1 62.5 53.1 61.7 84.0 45.7 - 76.3
1994 67.1 70.7 74.4 59.3 72.0 82.9 58.5 82.7 -
1995 58.2 74.0 74.7 54.4 68.4 88.6 48.7 74.7 -
Breyer 1996 60.5 77.9 67.1 53.5 65.1 76.7 52.3 81.4 -
1997 73.1 76.3 75.0 57.0 78.5 83.9 61.3 82.8 -
1998 56.3 70.0 68.4 50.0 60.0 78.8 50.0 76.3 -
a Tables II(Ai) and II(A2) record the frequency with which each pair of Justices voted to-
gether in full opinion decisions, including per curiam decisions containing sufficient legal reason-
ing to be considered full opinions. The percentages are drawn directly from the annual voting
alignment tables for all written opinions. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics,
1i8 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499 tbl.I(Bi) (2004). For a full explanation of how these figures were de-
termined, see id. at 5Oi n.g.
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TABLE 11 (continued)
(A2) VOTING ALIGNMENTS BY PERCENTAGE: 1999-2003'
0
w) 0 .5 r
-~ > 0 0
1999 - 48.1 92.2 74.0
2000 - 49.4 81.0 84.9
Rehnquist 2001 - 54.3 72.7 76.3
2002 - 57.7 79.2 75.6
2003 - 52.5 85.9 69.6
1999 48.1 - 51.9 41.6
2000 49.4 - 57.1 41.2
Stevens 2001 54.3 - 61.0 40.0
2002 57.7 - 61.0 51.3
2003 52.5 - 60.3 40.5
1999 92.2 51.9 - 67.5
2000 81.0 57.1 - 71.4
O'Connor 2001 72.7 61.0 - 61.8
2002 79.2 61.0 - 64.9
2003 85.9 60.3 - 64.9
57.1 76.6 59.7
57,6 86.0 54.7
56,8 76.5 58.0
70,5 70.1 70.5
55.7 73.8 61.3
84.4 49.4 85.7
81.0 44.7 78.8
80.2 44.4 84.0
78.2 48.1 71.8
83.5 42.5 81.3
63.6 74.0 66.2
65.1 72.6 66.7
77.9 57.1 62.3
74.0 63.2 67.5
64.9 61.5 67.9
1999 74.0 41.6 67.5 - 71.4 46.8 89.6 45.5 53.2
2000 84.9 41.2 71.4 - 79.1 50.6 89.5 48.8 47.1
Scalia 2001 76.3 40.0 61.8 - 73.8 43.8 82.5 40.0 40.5
2002 75.6 51.3 64.9 - 74.4 60.3 84.4 64.1 54.5
2003 69.6 40.5 64.9 - 60.8 44.9 75.9 48.1 46.8
1999 85.7 50.6 81.8 71.4 - 54.5 75.3 55.8 59.7
2000 89.5 57.6 79.8 79.1 - 65.9 77.9 62.8 60.0
Kennedy 2001 82.7 56.8 72.7 73.8 - 63.0 76.5 61.7 61.3
2002 89.7 61.5 72.7 74.4 - 73.1 70.1 69.2 66.2
2003 82.5 58.8 76.9 60.8 - 62.0 65.0 60.0 62.8
1999 57.1 84.4 63.6 46.8 54.5 - 54.5 88.3 81.8
2000 57.6 81.0 65.1 50.6 65.9 - 50.6 90.6 83.3
Souter 2001 56.8 80.2 77.9 43.8 63.0 - 40.7 86.4 80.0
2002 70.5 78.2 74.0 60.3 73.1 - 53.2 91.0 83.1
2003 55.7 83.5 64.9 44.9 62.0 - 46.8 87.3 75.6
1999 76.6 49.4 74.0 89.6 75.3 54.5 - 51.9 50.6
2000 86.0 44.7 72.6 89.5 77.9 50.6 - 48.8 48.2
Thomas 2001 76.5 44.4 57.1 82.5 76.5 40.7 - 45.7 46.3
2002 70.1 48.1 63.2 84.4 70.1 53.2 - 53.2 44.7
2003 73.8 42.5 61.5 75.9 65.0 46.8 - 48.8 47.4
1999 59.7 85.7 66.2 45.5 55.8 88.3 51.9 - 80.5
2000 54.7 78.8 66.7 48.8 62.8 90.6 48.8 - 87.1
Ginsburg 2001 58.0 84.0 62.3 40.0 61.7 86.4 45.7 - 83.8
2002 70.5 71.8 67.5 64.1 69.2 91.0 53.2 - 84.4
2003 61.3 81.3 67.9 48.1 60.0 87.3 48.8 - 87.2
1999 66.2 76.6 72.7 53.2 59.7 81.8 50.6 80.5 -
2000 51.8 81.0 67.5 47.1 60.0 83.3 48.2 87.1 -
Breyer 2001 61.3 83.8 65.8 40.5 61.3 80.0 46.3 83.8 -
2002 68.8 68.8 73.7 54.5 66.2 83.1 44.7 84.4 -
2003 66.7 75.6 76.3 46.8 62.8 75.6 47.4 87.2 -
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TABLE II (continued)
(B) AVERAGE VOTING ALIGNMENTS'
>0 U
LI) U) U .
CD - 427 663 643 702 526 655 522 515
Rehnquist CN - 823 815 824 827 825 825 826 817
P - 51.9 81.3 78.0 84.9 63.8 79.4 63.2 63.0
CD 427 - 463 363 483 626 372 641 615
Stevens CN 823 - 812 820 823 821 821 822 814
P 51.9 - 57.0 44.3 58.7 76.2 45.3 78.0 75.6
CD 663 463 - 570 640 580 572 538 576
O'Connor CN 815 812 - 812 815 813 813 814 805
P 81.3 57.0 - 70.2 78.5 71.3 70.4 66.1 71.6
CD 643 363 570 - 601 455 713 440 421
Scalia CN 824 820 812 - 824 822 822 823 814
P 78.0 44.3 70.2 - 72.9 55.4 86.7 53.5 51.7
CD 702 483 640 601 - 560 608 551 536
Kennedy CN 827 823 815 824 - 825 825 826 817
P 84.9 58.7 78.5 72.9 - 67.9 73.7 66.7 65.6
CD 526 626 580 455 560 - 445 705 665
Souter CN 825 821 813 822 825 - 823 824 816
P 63.8 76.2 71.3 55.4 67.9 - 54.1 85.6 81.5
CD 655 372 572 713 608 445 - 430 416
Thomas CN 825 821 813 822 825 823 - 824 815
P 79.4 45.3 70.4 86.7 73.7 54.1 - 52.2 51.0
CD 522 641 538 440 551 705 430 - 670
Ginsburg CN 826 822 814 823 826 824 824 - 816
P 63.2 78.0 66.1 53.5 66.7 85.6 52.2 - 82.1
CD 515 615 576 421 536 665 416 670 -
Breyer CN 817 814 805 814 817 816 815 816 -
P 63.0 75.6 71.6 51.7 65.6 81.5 51.0 82.1 -
b This table records the total number of decisions ("CD") in which one Justice voted in agree-
ment with another Justice over the last decade. "CN" represents the cumulative number of deci-
sions in which both Justices participated and thus the total number of opportunities for agree-
ment. "P" represents the percentage of cases in which two Justices agreed, calculated by dividing
CD by CN. Note that CD = ID and CN = IN, where D and N are drawn directly from the vot-
ing alignment tables for all written opinions for each of the last ten years. E.g., The Supreme
Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499 tbl.I(BI), 5o n.g (2004). Note also
that this table includes all opinions authored by the Justices rather than solely non-unanimous
opinions; because the Justices tend to agree quite often, the rates of agreement presented here are
higher than those reflected in the annual presentation of voting patterns in non-unanimous cases.
See id. at 5oi n.h.
A previous Statistics retrospective noted that a change in the Law Review's methodology
for assessing agreement among Justices in separate opinions ("S") may have resulted in slight
overreporting of the rates of agreement for certain Terms. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-The
Supreme Court in the Nineties: A Statistical Retrospective, 114 HARV. L. REV. 402, 404 n.a
(2ooo). However, calculating rates of agreement as a quotient of the decisions in which the Jus-
tices agreed ("D") has eliminated any such overreporting by counting agreements between Justices
only once for any particular case without respect to the number of opinions two Justices joined
together. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2o3 Term-The Statistics, supra, at 5oi n.g.
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TABLE III
(A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES:
TOTAL OPINIONS WRITTEN
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Rehnquist 16 15 14 17 18 14 14 14 12 14 148 14.8
Stevens 34 35 32 30 34 32 34 25 28 29 313 31.3
O'Connor 29 15 22 16 15 15 17 21 17 14 181 18.1
Scalia 24 26 28 35 21 25 29 27 25 30 270 27.0
Kennedy 15 18 12 20 18 19 14 17 19 23 175 17.5
Souter 18 20 19 21 15 23 17 17 22 18 190 19.0
Thomas 23 22 16 17 24 21 22 23 27 27 222 22.2
Ginsburg 21 18 17 22 19 18 20 17 17 16 185 18.5
Breyer 16 19 26 27 22 23 24 23 18 22 220 22.0
Total 196 188 186 205 186 190 191 184 185 193 1904 -
Average 21.8 20.9 20.7 22.8 20.7 21.1 21.2 20.4 20.6 21.4 - 21.2a
(B) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES:
TOTAL DISSENTING VOTES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Rehnquist 13 14 13 10 16 9 14 12 11 12 124 12.4
Stevens 26 24 27 23 29 31 28 24 20 19 251 25.1
O'Connor 12 8 12 11 8 8 8 10 9 5 91 9.1
Scalia 15 17 18 23 13 20 18 22 21 21 188 18.8
Kennedy 6 6 6 7 9 12 7 9 15 11 88 8.8
Souter 16 12 12 16 16 24 18 18 13 17 162 16.2
Thomas 21 18 17 18 16 17 17 17 28 17 186 18.6
Ginsburg 12 16 17 17 20 24 21 17 18 16 178 17.8
Breyer 12 16 23 14 19 23 23 15 18 15 178 17.8
Total 133 131 145 139 146 168 154 144 153 133 1446 -
Average 14.8 14.6 16.1 15.4 16.2 18.7 17.1 16.0 17.0 14.8 - 16.1
a
' These figures represent the average annual number of opinions and dissents per Justice over
the ten-year period.
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TABLE IV
UNANIMITY AND DISSENTa
Unanimous With Concurrence With Dissent 5-4 Total
1994 28 (32.6%) 8 (9.3%) 50 (58.1%) 16 (18.6%) 86
1995 29 (38.7%) 3 (4.0%) 43 (57.3%) 11 (14.7%) 75
1996 32 (37.2%) 7 (8.1%) 47 (54.7%) 18 (20.9%) 86
1997 40 (43.0%) 6 (6.5%) 47 (50.5%) 15 (16.1%) 93
1998 24 (29.6%) 5 (6.2%) 52 (64.2%) 16 (19.8%) 81
1999 27 (35.1%) 5 (6.5%) 45 (58.4%) 18 (23.4%) 77
2000 30 (34.9%) 7 (8.1%) 49 (57.0%) 27 (31.4%) 86
2001 27 (33.3%) 6 (7.4%) 48 (59.3%) 21 (25.9%) 81
2002 30 (38.5%) 5 (6.4%) 43 (55.1%) 14 (17.9%) 78
2003 25 (31.3%) 12 (15.0%) 43 (53.8%) 19 (23.8%) 80
Total 292 (35.5%) 64 (7.8%) 467 (56.7%) 175 (21.3%) 823
a For explanations of the figures in this table, see the notes accompanying Tables I(C)-(E) of
the annual Statistics. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
497, 502-03 nn.i-v (2004). Note that, due to rounding, the sum of the percentages representing
the proportion of unanimous, with concurrence, and with dissent cases may be slightly greater
than ioo.o%.
TABLE V
(A) 5-4 DECISIONS: VOTING WITH THE MAJORITYa
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Rehnquist 10 7 12 9 9 13 18 15 8 10 111
Stevens 8 3 9 6 8 5 9 8 7 10 73
O'Connor 11 9 13 10 11 15 21 17 13 15 135
Scalia 9 7 10 7 10 14 18 14 7 10 106
Kennedy 13 9 14 13 11 13 21 15 7 12 128
Souter 6 4 9 5 8 6 11 7 8 9 73
Thomas 8 7 10 11 10 15 18 14 6 12 111
Ginsburg 8 5 6 6 7 5 10 6 6 9 68
Breyer 7 4 7 8 6 4 9 9 8 8 70
Totalb 16 11 18 15 16 18 27 21 14 19 175
a This table records the number of times that each Justice voted with the majority in a 5-4
decision. For an explanation of the voting arrangements that constitute a 5-4 decision, as well as
a detailed list of the cases included here, see the notes accompanying Table I(E) of the annual Sta-
tistics. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 503 nn.n-v
(2004).
b The numbers in this row represent the total number of 5-4 decisions rendered by the Court
in a given Term.
2004]
TABLE V (continued)
(B) 5-4 DECISIONS: VOTING BLOCS
CONSTITUTING THE MAJORITYc
Justices Constituting the Majority Number of Decisions
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 82
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 28
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 14
Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 3
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg 3
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 3
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 3
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 2
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer 2
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer 2
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 2
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 1
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 1
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 1
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 1
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 1
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Breyer 1
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 1
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Total 175
This table records the number of times over the last ten years that a particular group of five
Justices has constituted the majority in a 5-4 decision. For a detailed definition of the voting ar-
rangements necessary for a case to be included as a 5-4 decision, see the notes accompanying Ta-
ble I(E) of the annual Statistics. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term-The Statistics, i i8 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 503 nn.n-v (2004).
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TABLE VI
(A) ORIGIN OF ALL CASES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Federal Courts 72 72 81 83 70 64 68 71 57 70 706 70.6
Circuit Courts 69 68 71 80 66 62 66 70 53 68 671 67.1
First Circuit 1 4 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 15 1.5
Second Circuit 3 4 6 3 4 3 8 4 2 2 39 3.9
Third Circuit 5 2 3 4 6 1 5 1 0 4 31 3.1
Fourth Circuit 3 10 3 2 4 9 5 11 3 4 54 5.4
Fifth Circuit 8 1 5 12 5 9 6 2 3 6 57 5.7
Sixth Circuit 7 4 3 3 4 4 7 10 7 8 57 5.7
Seventh Circuit 7 7 3 7 4 8 4 2 3 4 49 4.9
Eighth Circuit 5 4 8 13 3 5 3 5 1 4 51 5.1
Ninth Circuit 17 13 28 17 18 10 17 18 23 25 185 18.5
Tenth Circuit 4 5 3 1 4 2 4 4 1 3 31 3.1
Eleventh Circuit 3 5 6 2 8 5 3 4 4 4 44 4.4
D.C. Circuit 3 5 1 9 2 3 1 3 3 3 32 3.2
Federal Circuit 3 4 1 2 4 2 2 5 2 1 26 2.6
District Courts 2 3 9 2 3 2 2 1 4 2 30 3.0
Other Courts 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.5
State Courts 12 11 9 10 11 12 14 9 21 8 117 11.7
Total 84 83 90 93 81 76 82 80 78 78 823 82.3
(B) ORIGIN OF AFFIRMED CASES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Federal Courts 23 26 20 33 21 26 24 17 15 16 221 22.1
Circuit Courts 22 24 15 32 20 24 24 16 14 15 206 20.6
First Circuit 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 8 0.8
Second Circuit 1 1 0 2 1 0 5 0 0 0 10 1.0
Third Circuit 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 0 0 1 14 1.4
Fourth Circuit 1 1 1 1 2 4 3 4 0 3 20 2.0
Fifth Circuit 3 0 1 6 1 3 3 0 0 0 17 1.7
Sixth Circuit 3 2 1 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 16 1.6
Seventh Circuit 5 3 0 3 0 2 2 2 1 2 20 2.0
Eighth Circuit 0 1 4 5 2 4 2 1 0 1 20 2.0
Ninth Circuit 3 2 1 3 4 1 4 4 5 6 33 3.3
Tenth Circuit 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 12 1.2
Eleventh Circuit 1 1 4 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 12 1.2
D.C. Circuit 0 3 0 5 1 3 0 1 2 0 15 1.5
Federal Circuit 1 4 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 9 0.9
District Courts 1 1 4 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 13 1.3
Other Courts 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.2
State Courts 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 2 4 2 29 2.9
Total 26 29 23 36 23 30 26 19 19 18 250 25.0
2004.
TABLE VI (continued)
(C) ORIGIN OF VACATED CASES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Federal Courts 8 13 17 13 14 1 5 9 8 10 97 9.7
Circuit Courts 7 13 14 13 14 1 4 9 7 10 91 9.1
First Circuit 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.2
Second Circuit 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.2
Third Circuit 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 4 0.4
Fourth Circuit 0 4 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 9 0.9
Fifth Circuit 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 0.6
Sixth Circuit 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.4
Seventh Circuit 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0.6
Eighth Circuit 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 0.7
Ninth Circuit 2 1 7 1 4 1 2 3 5 3 29 2.9
Tenth Circuit 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.4
Eleventh Circuit 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 6 0.6
D.C. Circuit 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 7 0.7
Federal Circuit 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 5 0.5
District Courts 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 0.6
Other Courts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0State Courts 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 7 o 7
Total 8 13 17 15 14 1 6 10 11 10 104 10.4
(D) ORIGIN OF REVERSED CASES
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Avg.
Federal Courts 41 33 44 37 35 37 39 45 34 44 388 38.8
Circuit Courts 40 31 42 35 32 37 38 45 32 43 374 37.4
First Circuit 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0.5
Second Circuit 2 2 6 1 2 3 3 4 2 2 27 2.7
Third Circuit 3 0 1 1 3 0 3 0 0 2 13 1.3
Fourth Circuit 2 5 1 1 0 5 2 6 3 0 25 2.5
Fifth Circuit 5 1 3 4 3 6 2 2 3 5 34 3.4
Sixth Circuit 3 2 1 1 2 3 5 9 5 6 37 3.7
Seventh Circuit 2 3 3 1 2 6 2 0 2 2 23 2.3
Eighth Circuit 4 2 3 6 1 1 1 3 0 3 24 2.4
Ninth Circuit 12 10 20 13 10 8 11 11 13 16 123 12.3
Tenth Circuit 2 1 0 0 1 1 3 3 1 3 15 1.5
Eleventh Circuit 1 2 2 2 6 2 3 4 2 2 26 2.6
D.C. Circuit 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 10 1.0
Federal Circuit 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 12 1.2
District Courts 0 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 11 1.1
Other Courts 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.3
State Courts 9 8 6 5 9 8 11 6 14 6 81 8.1
Total 50 41 50 42 44 45 50 51 48 50 469 46.9
